when the causes of that's paration have become obscured and half forgotten. We with full respect for each individual conscience and without compromising anyone's deeply cherished convictions-to pray together to our Father in Heaven and beg the abiding presence and strength of His Spirit among us all to help heal our dis-unions. We wish to work together as brothers to help and comfort all our fellow men; to be increasingly and in very truth "light of the world" and "salt of the earth." It is this spirit, I believe, that is especially characteristic of religious people today in America and Canada. It is for this movement, with its vast potential for the betterment of our world under God's law, that I would tonight invite your reflections, your prayerful interests, your dedicated efforts.

In just 1 month, I return to Rome for the fourth and final session of the second Vatican council. Under the original impetus of Pope John and with the continuing inspiration of the present holy father, Pope Paul VI, this ecumenical council has dramatically enlivened the worldwide spirit of brotherhood. I do not, of course, mean that the second Vatican council marked the beginning of the ecumenical movement either in the Catholic Church or in the Christian churches generally. This is simply not true. But since I am not attempting a history of ecumenism, I speak of the second Vatican council as a most important, and worldwide example of the spirit and goals of ecumenism.

In the autumn of last year, the council voted and Pope Paul promulgated the decree on ecumenism. I should like to quote one section from this decree which, I believe, embodies the aspirations of all men of good will. "Before the whole world let all Christians confess their faith in God \* \* \* united in their efforts, and with mutual fespect, let them bear witness to our common hope \* \* \*. In these days when cooperation in social matters is so widespread, all men without exception are called to work together. Cooperation among Christians vividly expresses that bond which already unites them. Such cooperation which has already begun in many countries, should be developed more and more, it should contribute to a just evaluation of the dignity of the human person, to the establishment of the blessings of peace. It should also be intensified in the use of every possible means to relieve the afflictions of our times, such as famine and natural disasters, illiteracy, and poverty, lack of housing, and the unequal distribution of

"All believers can, through this cooperation, be led to acquire a better knowledge and appreciation of one another, and pave the way to Christian unity."

These are, I believe, stirring and challenging words. Yet this is only one short section in the council's decree. And what is most significant, it seems to me, is that, while just 1 year ago these words may well have expressed the feelings of many or even most people of faith, today they represent the official position of the entire church, the solemn public rededication of the church to the ecumenical movement.

In the final session of the council this fall, it is expected-in fact, it is a practical certainty—that other important declarations will be promulgated to fulfill and implement the decree on ecumenism. The declaration on the Jews and other non-Christian peoples, the constitution on the church in the modern world—all these momentous subjects should and will contribute immensely to the spirit and practice of ecumenism.

Undoubtedly, for many years to come, theologians and scholars of all the churches and faiths will be joined in discussions to

explain to one another more carefully their own positions, to achieve better understanding of their differing traditions, and to mark out as clearly as possible the important areas of agreement already possessed. Their road will inevitably be long; their way frequently far from clear. But a giant step forward has already been taken. Theologians and scholars, like all of us, have begun to think and speak as we all ought to think and speak—as friends, as neighbors, as brothers— with reverence for the truth wherever it is found, with scrupulous respect for one another's convictions, with profound awareness that others are at least as sincere and as good in their hearts as we are.

Such long-range, persevering scholarly work is absolutely essential for the success of the ecumenical movement. Yet I am sure that you and I know quite well that by itself it will never suffice. Neither the religious leaders of all the churches nor the theologians of all the faiths can by themselves cope with the overall tragedy of Christian disunity. It is, of necessity, the task of all of us, of all who see that the division of the churches is a detriment to the life-giving power of God's word, hurts our common brotherhood under God, lessens the effectiveness of all our efforts for our fellow men.

Leaders of all the churches are actively engaged in this movement. Theologians are more involved than ever in discussion and dialog. But ultimately it is the layman who most directly meets the world and most intimately affects its people for good or evil and, therefore, it is the layman of each and every faith who must demonstrate the ecumenical spirit if that spirit is to live and quicken and truly fill the whole world.

Ecumenism has no precise timetable; neither does it have any slightest guarantee of immunity from setbacks. We must take it for granted that the road will be long and will have its reverses and failures. There are undoubtedly innumerable questions of policy and procedure—some foreseeable, others not—which each church and even each believer will have to face in the days and years ahead. But, however long range and far reaching the program is, we can all begin and we must all begin the development of those attitudes of mind and heart which the second Vatican Council calls "the soul of the ecumenical movement." We must begin the most serious ment." efforts to fulfill all the implications of that life of brotherly love which our fatth in God demands. We must begin to beg the pardon of other believers for our offenses against them and to forgive fully from our hearts those who have trespassed against us. We must begin seriously to listen, candidly to learn and sympathetically to understand the different views of our friends and brothers.

I am convinced that ecumenism is a spirit and a movement thoroughly harmonious with the ideals of our nations; that our countrymen have much to contribute to it and can richly profit from it. I believe further that ecumenism is most congenial with the purposes and goals of your Order of Eagles and it is because I believe this, that I have spoken to you on this subject tonight. I know your history; I know your dedication to your fellow men; I know the glorious record of achievement that has followed upon that dedication; I know your hopes for "freedom under God's law in our world." And because of what I know, I feel confident that in the years to come each of you will cherish and foster the spirit of the ecumenical movement—for the glory of God, for strengthening the bonds of our brotherhood, and ultimately for the peace and happiness of all men everywhere.

Congressman Howard's Address at Institute for Advanced Learning, Lakewood, N.J.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

# HON. HERBERT TENZER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, September 15, 1965

Mr. TENZER. Mr. Speaker, our colleague, the Honorable James J. Howard, Third District, New Jersey, made a most significant address on the occasion of the dedication of a new dining hall at the world renowned Institute for Advanced Learning at Lakewood, N.J.

The late Rabbi Aaron Kotler, Z.L., who founded the Beth Medrash Govoha, was indeed a spiritual giant among Torah scholars who evoked homage and world recognition in his own time and in our generation. It is most fitting that this Institute for Advanced Learning has been named in his memory.

It was my privilege to serve as chairman of the building committee which raised the sum of \$500,000 to complete the magnificent structure which houses the Institute for Advanced Learning.

From the beginning and throughout my association with the school, the institute was conceived as a school for scholars, a place of learning for those exceptional students whose thoughts and actions and very existence are consecrated solely to the study of the Holy Book. It was to be an institute for advanced study, a training ground for excellence. To be accepted as a student was to be a mark of achievement.

Today, the institute has a graduate department of 150 student-scholars—a postgraduate department of 71 fellow-ship scholars—a total of 221 dedicated scholars who come from 17 States and 9 foreign countries.

Graduates of the institute fill important posts in religious educational institutions throughout the Nation, 15 States and in 3 foreign countries: 90 serve as heads and teachers in Hebrew schools of higher learning; 21 serve as deans, principals and administrators in Hebrew schools of higher learning; 23 serve as day school teachers and in other Jewish community work; and 42 occupy pulpits as rabbis.

Mr. Speaker, our colleague's remarks make worthwhile reading and that is why I include the text of the address in the RECORD:

ADDRESS OF JAMES J. HOWARD, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, DEDICATION OF NEW DINING HALL, BETH MEDRASH GOVOHA, RABBI AARON KOT-LER INSTITUTE, SEPTEMBER 12, 1965

"My son, eat thou honey, because it is good; and the honeycomb, which is sweet to thy taste: so shall the knowledge of wisdom be unto thy soul; when thou hast found it, then there shall be a reward, and thy expectation shall not be cut off."—Proverbs, chapter 24, verses 13 and 14.

This text has appealed to me for the present occasion because it has reference at the same time to the immediate object of our

dedication, this new dining hall, and to the larger, more general purpose of the institute and school which it is built to serve. Those who come to eat food in this noble dining hall, eating food selected and prepared in accordance with long-established religious dietary rules, will surely find goodness and sweetness in that food, as well as the nourishment they need for the strength to pursue their exacting scriptural studies. So, too, in the studies they undertake in the Beth Medrash Govoha, this school for scholars, they will experience the sweetness of the truest, deepest, and highest wisdom, the wisdom of the Torah. It is fitting and proper that the students here, who are preparing to lead and guide and teach the leaders and guides and teachers of Israel, should be housed and fed in a manner befitting the nobility of their calling, and the loftiness of their en-deavor. The calm and noble beauty of this room is well planned for the least possible interruption to a scholar's meditations on the subtleties of scriptural language, or the

depths of moral and spiritual meaning.
One of the finest attributes of the Jewish tradition is the primary importance given, in Jewish life, to learning, and particularly to that most precious learning, the study of Scripture. I am happy to have this opportunity to express my own admiration for that tradition, and my happiness in noting that Christian scholarship, both among Prot-estants and among Catholics, has in recent years shown a strong revival of interest in the direct study of the Bible, as well as in the historical, archaeological, and linguistic studies that tend to illuminate the scriptural text. There has been, too, a refreshing willingness among Biblical scholars of different faiths to share their knowledge, and discuss their problems. One interesting outcome of this phenomenon, of which you may have heard, is the new edition, approved for use by Catholics, of the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, which was at first prepared entirely under Protestant auspices. Of more lasting significance, doubtless, is the custom, now more and more observed, of staffing the divinity schools and schools of religion, in the various universities, with scripture scholars belonging to various religious traditions. In this development, most profitable and advantageous to the students in our American universities, I foresee a great future value for the Beth Medrash Govoha, as scholars, well prepared here, may go forth to enkindle, in the students of secular universities, the fire of the knowledge and love of the Torah. This institute for advanced Torah studies, this training-ground for excellence, must spread its influence, not through Jewish institutions alone, but through all schools and universities that try to give to their students the knowledge and the love of the scriptures.

May your students, fed in this hall on the food of the body, and fed in the rest of this school on the food of the mind, live up to your highest hopes for them. May they serve as channels for the highest wisdom know to man, and teachers of the highest code of ethical conduct.

I am proud and pleased that Lakewood should be honored, as the home of so outstanding a religious and intellectual institution as the Rabbi Aaron Kotler Institute for Advanced Learning. The dignity and repose of this fine building, admirably adapted both for solltary study and meditation, and for group discussion and occasional sociability, will surely aid in the formation of a new generation of splendid Torah scholars, in whom the name of the founder, Ray Aaron Kotler, will be deservedly blessed over and over again. For as a father is blessed in the succeeding generations of his sons, and his sons' sons, so is a teacher blessed in the students who follow him, and in their turn become teachers, and the teachers of teachers. And in this connection, it is surely appropriate that I pay tribute to Rav Shnur Kotler, who stands here as the second generation in each of these aspects, being both a son succeeding to the place of his father in this house, and a teacher carrying on the tradition of his teacher. It is fortunate for Lakewood, and for the Beth Medrash Govoha, that such a teacher had such a pupil; that such a father had such a son; and that the institution founded by the father is showing such growth and promise under the leadership of the son.

From generation to generation, and through many years to come, may this school of holy wisdom and righteousness, and this dining hall within it, stand before the world as a spectacular fulfillment of the riddle of Samson, under the figure of the honeycomb in the carcass of a lion: "Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness."

### **Dominican Republic Intervention**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

ON. WILLIAM F. KIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 21, 1965

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, at the conclusion of the Senate hearings on the recent intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic, Senator Fulbricht in a statement critical of our policy in that area raised important questions in regard to our policy. In an article in the July 1965 edition of War/Peace Report, Dr. Juan Bosch, former President of the Dominican Republic sheds further light on the circumstances in the Dominican Republic prior to the intervention. I wish to call the attention of my colleagues to the following article:

[From War/Peace Report, July 1965] COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Speaking from his own experience, the former President of the Dominican Republic addresses himself to this question: Can democracy best be promoted, and communism halted, through the use of force or intelligence?)

#### (By Juan Bosch)

(Note.—Juan Bosch is the first man in the history of the Dominican Republic to have become its President through a free election. He won his overwhelming—and surprising—victory in December 1962. But in September 1963, he was overthrown by the military. In April of this year, pro-Bosch forces revolted against the government of Donald Reid, leading to the present crisis.)

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.—After the U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo, the Department of State first released a list of 53 Dominican Communists; then a list of 58; and finally, a list of 77.

When I was President of the Dominican Republic, I calculated that in Santo Domingo there were between 700 and 800 Communists, and I estimated the number of Communists sympathizers at between 3,000 and 3,500. These 700 or 800 Communists were divided into three groups, of which, in my judgment, the largest was the Popular Dominican Movement, with perhaps between 400 and 500 members in the entire country; next came the Popular Socialist Party with somewhat less, around 300 to 400; and then, in a number that in my opinion did not reach 50, the Communists had infiltrated the

June 14th movement, some of them in executive posts and others at lower levels.

I ought to make clear that in 1963 in the Dominican Republic there was much political confusion, and a large number of people, especially middle class youth, did not know for certain what they were and what they wanted to be, whether Democrats or Com-munists. But that has happened in almost all countries where there have been prolonged dictatorships, once the dictatorships pass. After a certain time has elapsed and the political panorama becomes clarified, many people who began their public life as Communists pass into the Democratic camp. In 1963 the Dominican Republic needed time for the Democratic system to clear up the confusion, and in a sense the time was used that way, since 700 or 800 Communists, divided into three groups, with sympathizers numbering between 3,000 and 3,500, could in no case—not even with arms in their hands—take power or even represent a serious threat.

If there weren't enough Communists to take power, there was on the other hand a strong sentiment against persecution of the Communists. This feeling developed because during his long tyranny Trujillo always accused his adversaries of being Communists. Because of that, anticommunism and Trujilloism ended up being equivalent terms in the Dominican political vocabulary. Moreover, the instruments of oppression—the police and the armed forces—remained the same in 1963—with the same men who had served under Trujillo. If I had used them against the Communists I would have ended up as their prisoner, and they, for their part, would have completely destroyed the Dominican democratic forces. For those men, having learned from Trujillo, there was no distinction between Democrats and Communists; anyone who opposed any of their rollence, or even their corruption, was a Communist and ought to be annihilated.

#### INSTANT PERSECUTION

My presumption was correct, as events have shown. From the dawn of September 25, the day of the coup d'etat against the government. I headed, the police began to perscute and beat without mercy all the non-Communist democrats who in the opinion of the military chiefs would be able to resist the coup. It was known that in all the country not one Communist had infiltrated my party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), but still the leaders and members of that party were persecuted as Communists. The chief of police himself insulted the prisoners by calling them Communists.

Many leaders of the PRD were deported, and—a curious fact—numerous Communists who had been in Europe, Russia and Cuba were permitted to return. But the leaders of the PRD were not permitted to return, and if one did he was immediately deported again. During the 19 months of the government of Donald Reid, thousands of democrats from the PRD and hundreds from the Social Christian Party and the June 14th movement were jailed, deported, and beaten in a barbaric manner; the headquarters of these three parties were assaulted or destroyed by the police. All the vehicles, desks, typewriters and other valuable effects of the PRD were robbed by the police. In the months of May and June 1964, more than 1,000 mem-bers of the PRD who had been accused of being Communists were in jail at one time.

That anti-Communist fury launched against the democratic Dominicans was an important factor in the eruption of the April revolution because the people were fighting to regain their right to live under a legal order, not a police state. If it had been I who unleashed that fury, the revolution would have been against the democratic regime, not in favor of democracy.

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It was not necessary to be a political genius to realize that if anti-Communist persecution began in the Dominican Republic the police and the military would also persecute the democrats. Neither need one be a political genius to understand that what the country needed was not stimulation of the mad forces of Trujilloism which still existed in the police and the military, but rather the strengthening of democracy by demonstrating to the Dominicans in practice that what was best for them and the country was to live under the legal order of a democratic regime.

Now then, in the Dominican picture there was a force that in my opinion was determining the pointer of the political balance, in terms of ideologies and doctrines, and that force was the June 14th movement.

I have said that according to my calculations there was in the June 14th Movement an infiltration of less than 50 Communists, some of them in executive positions and others at lower levels. But I must state that control of this party, at all levels, was held by an overwhelming majority of young people who were not Communists and some whom were strongly anti-Communist. How can one explain that there should be Communists together with non-Communists and active anti-Communists? There is one reason: the June 14th Movement was based, in all its breadth and at all its levels, on intense nationalism, and that nationalism was manifested above all in terms of strong anti-Americanism. To convert that antinorteamericanismo into dominicanismo there was only one way: maintain for a long time a democratic regime with a dynamic and creative sense.

#### APPETITE FOR POWER

I knew that if the country saw the establishment of a government that was not elected by the people—that was not constitutional and not respectful of civil liberties—the Communists would attribute this new government to U.S. maneuvers. I also knew that in view of the anti-Americanism of the youth of the middle class—especially in the June 14th Movement—Communist influence would increase. The equilibrium of the political balance was, then, in that party. Any sensible Dominican politician realized that. The trouble was that in 1963 the Dominican Republic did not have sensible politicians, or at least not enough of them. The appetites for power held in check for a third of a century overflowed, and the politicians turned to conspiring with Tru-jillo's military men. The immediate result was the coup of September 1963; the delayed result was the revolution of April 1965.

It is easy to understand why Dominican youth of the middle class was so national-istic. This youth loved its country, wanted to see it morally and politically clean, hoped for its economic development, and thoughtwith reason—that it was Trujillo who blocked morality, liberty and development of the country. It is also easy to understand why this nationalism took the form of anti-Americanism. It was simply a feeling of frustration. This youth, which had not been able to get rid of Trujillo, thought that Trujillo was in power because of his support by the United States. For them, the United States and Trujillo were partners, both to be blamed for what was happening in the Dominican Republic, and for that reason their hate for Trujillo was naturally con-verted into feelings of anti-Americanism.

I am not discussing here whether they were right or wrong; I am simply stating the fact. I know that in the United States there are people who supported Trujillo and others who attacked him. But the young Dominicans knew only the former and not the latter, since Trujillo took care to give the greatest publicity possible to any demon-stration of support, however small, that was offered directly or indirectly by a U.S. citizen, whether he was a senator or an ordinary tourist; and on the other hand, he took great pains to prevent even the smallest notice in the Dominican Republic of any attack by an American citizen. Thus, the Dominican youth knew only tha Trujillo had defenders in the United States, not that he had enemies.

For his part, Trujillo succeeded in creating with the Dominican people an image of unity between society and government that can only be compared with wh. has been produced in countries with Communist regimes. For more than 30 years in the Dominican Republic nothing happened—nothing could happen—without an express or-der from Trujillo. In the minds of Dominican youth this image was generalized, and they thought that in the United States also nothing could happen without an order from whoever governed in Washington. Thus, for them, when an American senator, newspaperman or businessman expressed his support of Trujillo, that person was talk-ing by order of the President of the United States. To this very day, a large number of Dominicans of the middle class think that everything a U.S. citizen says, his Government is saying too.

The pointer of the political balance, as I

said earlier, was in the June 14th Movement, which was saturated with anti-Americanisms. This group included the most fervent youths and even those best qualified technically—but not politically—as the more numerous nucleus of middle class youth; it also constituted the social sector where Communist sermons could have the most effect and from whence could come the resolute leaders that the Communist lacked. Trujillo had tortured, assassinated and made martyrs of hundreds of members of the June 14th Movement. To persecute these youths was to send them into the arms of communism, to give strength to the arguments of the few Communists that had infiltrated the movement. The Communists said that the democracy that I headed received its orders from Washington, the same as had Trujillo, to destroy the nationalistic youths. Little by little, as the days passed, the non-Communist and anti-Communist members of the June 14th Movement were gaining ground against the Communists, since they were able to prove to their companions that my democratic government neither per-secuted them nor took orders from Washington. In 4 years, the democratic but nationalistic sector of the June 14th Moverment— which was in the overwhelming majority would have ended the Communist influence and made itself into a firm support of Dominican democracy.

### A CHANGE OF TARGETS

The weakness of the Dominican Communists was also shown by the activity of the Social Christian Party, which presented it-self as militantly anti-Communist. It persecuted the Communists everywhere, to the point that they could not show themselves in public. But when the Social Christians realized that the best source of young people in the country was the June 14 Movement, they stopped their street fighting against the and began Communists against imperialismo norteamericano. When they showed with this battle cry that they were not a pro-United States party, they began to attract young adherents who had been members of the June 14th Movement as well as many others who already had a clear idea of what they wanted to be: nationalists and democrats. Thus, the Social Christian leaders came to understand that the key to the Dominican political future lay in assuring the nationalistic youth of a worthy and constructive democracy.

What the Social Christians learned by 1963 would have been understood by other political groups if the Dominican democracy had been given time. But this was not be. Re-

actionaires in the Dominican Republic and the United States set themselves ferociously against the Dominican democracy under the slogan that my government was "soft" on the Communists.

This is the point at which to analyze weakness and force, if those two terms signify opposite concepts. There are two ways to face problems, particularly political ones. One is to use intelligence and the other is to use force. According to this theory, intelligence is weak, and the use of intelligence, a sign of weakness.

I think that a subject so complex as political feelings and ideas ought to be treated with intelligence. I think also that force is a concept that expresses different values, as can be seen in the United States or in the Dominican Republic. In the United States, the use of force means the application of the law—without crimes, without torture, without medieval barbarism; in the Dominican Republic, it means dutte the contrary; one does not apply the law without instru-ments of torture, not excluding assassination. When a Dominican policeman says of a person that he is a Communist, he is saying that he, the policeman, has the full right to beat him, to shoot him, or to kill him. And since this policeman does not know how to distinguish between a democrat and a Communist, he is quite apt to beat, shoot, and kill a democrat.

It is not easy to change the mentality of the people who become policemen in Dominican Republic, especially with little time to do it. When the New Englanders burned women as witches, those who did the burning believed absolutely that they were destroying witches. Today, nobody believes that they were witches. But it is still like early Salem in Santo Domingo. When a Dominican policeman is told that he should persecute a young man because he is a Communist, the policeman believes with all his soul that his duty is to kill the youth.

### COMMUNIST TAKEOVER?

The problem that my democratic government faced was to choose between the use of intelligence and use of force, while the time passed during which the hotheaded youths and uneducated police learned to distinguish between democracy and communism. And if someone says that in this period the Communists would be able to gain strength and take power, I say and guarantee that they could not do it. Only a dictatorship can give to the Communists the arguments they need for progress in the Dominican Republic; under a democratic regime the democratic conscience would outstrip the Communists.

To return to the concepts of intelligence and force, I think that they apply to communism itself in its fight for the conquest of power. No Communist Party, in no country of the world, has been able to reach power solely because it was strong; it has needed, besides, a leader of exceptional capacity. The Dominican Communists have not had and do not have force, and they have not had and do not have a leader comparable to Lenin, Mao, Tito, or Fidel; and according to my prediction, they are not going to have either the force or the leader in the foreseeable future.

Dominican communism is in its infancy. and began, as did Venezuelan communism, with internal divisions that will require many years to overcome. Only the long dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez was able to create the right atmosphere for the different groups of Communists of the Venezuela of 1945 so that they could come together into a single party, and the lack of a leader of a single party, and the tack of a leader of exceptional capacity has, in spite of the power of the party, voided the chance of Venezuelan communism coming to power.

How many Communists did France have?

How many Italy? But neither French nor Italian communism ever had leaders capable

of carrying it to power. In the Dominican case, there is neither the numbers nor the

leadership.

I cannot hope that men like Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, or Jules Dubois will know these things, will think about them and will act accordingly. But logically I had the right to expect that in Washington there would be someone who would understand the Dominican political scene and the role that the Communists could play in my country As is evident, I was mistaken. In Washington they know the Dominican problems only as they are told of them by Wessin y Wessin Antonio Imbert, and Jules Dubois.

The lack of adequate knowledge is tantamount to the nullification of the power of intelligence, above all in politics, and this can only lead to sorry results. When intelligence is canceled, its place is occupied by fear. Today there has spread over the countries of America a fear of communism that is leading us all to kill democracy for fear that democracy is the mask of communism.

It seems to me we have reached the point where we consider democracy incapable of resolving the problems of our peoples. And if we have truly arrived at this point, we have nothing to offer humanity. We are denying our faith, we are destroying the columns of the temple that throughout our life has been our shelter.

Are we really doing this? No, I should no; say this. It is the others. Because in spits of everything that has happened, I continue to believe that democracy is the dwelling place of human dignity.

# American Airpower in South Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

# HON. DONALD J. IRWIN

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, September 22, 1965

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call the attention of my colleagues to remarks made this morning by Congressman Pike, of New York, chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the House Armed Services Committee. Mr. Pike's well-reasoned statement at the opening of subcommittee hearings on the question of why American airpower has been unable to find and destroy the Vietcong in South Vietnam sets the tone for the hearings. As he said in his statement:

They (the hearings) will not be accompanied by spectacular press releases, nor will any of the issues to which we direct our attention be prejudged. It is our purpose to study, and if we can, to help solve them.

Congressman Pike's statement follows:

STATEMENT BY HON. OTIS G. PIKE, CHAIRMAIT, SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL A'R SUPPORT OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES CON-MITTEE, AT OPENING OF HEARINGS, SEPTEN-BER 22, 1965

In January 1961, in a report to a Communist Party conference, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev set forth the doctrine by which Communist conquest was to be governed in the future. He described four kinds of war; (1) World wars, (2) local wars, (3) liberation wars, and (4) popular uprisings.

Mr. Khrushchev announced to the world

Mr. Khrushchev announced to the word that international communism was opposed to both world wars and local wars as being

too dangerous for profitable utilization in a world armed with nuclear weapons.

With regard to what he referred to as wars of national liberation, however, he stated that the Communist movement would recognize and support such wars. With specific reference to the war in Vietnam, he said: "It is a sacred war."

For 4½ years we have been forewarned. What Khrushchev referred to as wars of national liberation and described as "sacred" in Vietnam have been translated on the battlefield and in the cities and countryside into attacks by terrorists at night, the blowing up of restaurants and buses as well as bridges and barracks. In a jungle environment attacks on government outposts are carried on most frequently by platoon or company-sized units at night. These small units are armed with mortars, recoilless rifles, machineguns, and automatic weapons. They do not have tanks or armored personnel carriers, and they walk into battle. They would be hard to find in a jungle environment in the daytime. They are harder to find during the night-time, which they claim for their own.

Arrayed against these small and elusive units is the military power of America. We have all the tanks that there are in South Vietnam. We have all the armored personnel carriers that there are in South Vietnam. We have almost all of the artillery, and we retain complete mastery of the skies. Over 20 different models of American aircraft, undisturbed by enemy aircraft, roam the skies of South Vietnam at will, subject only to the danger of ground fire from conventional small arms.

Many voices have been raised asking why our airpower is unable to find and destroy the Vietcong in South Vietnam. Chairman L. MENDEL RIVERS has asked this subcommittee to look into this question. Due to the present pressing congressional obligations of the members and staff of the subcommittee, we will have limited opportunities to travel for the purpose of field investigations until recess of this session of Congress. In addition, the time allotted to the subcommittee is not sufficient to allow us at this time to inquire into every detail related to tactical air support, and therefore we must limit our investigations to the following aspects:

 The adequacy of our close air support during the course of the war in Vietnam and today:

2. The availability of close air support 24 hours a day under all weather conditions;

3. The quantities available, the cost and effectiveness of the various tactical aircraft being used in South Vietnam today;

4. The adequacy of liaison and communications between the air forces and the ground forces in Vietnam:

5. The adequacy of existing logistic and support facilities for tactical aircraft in Viet-

nam;
6. The development of new tactics and techniques for close air support;

7. Whether any progress has been made in developing and producing a new type aircraft for close air support in limited war situations;

8. The adequacy of our training environment to simulate conditions such as those found in Vietnam.

For the purpose of the subcommittee during these investigations we have adopted the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of close air support: "Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

I believe that these hearings have a significance beyond our current confrontation in Vietnam. As we look at the globe we can see over much of its land surface other peoples who must be considered amendable to Communist propaganda, to Communist

subversion, to Communist terror. We see people who remain hungry, who remain ill clothed, ill housed, and uneducated. can see at the outset that no amount of military power of any kind is the answer to their problems. We would be blind indeed, however, if we could not also see, as we see in Vietnam, that no government can attack and solve these problems when it is the steady victim of armed terror and armed insurrection almed not at the solution of the people's problems, but at the dominaof the people themselves. As we look at the globe we also find countless other areas where not only the economic and social problems are the same as those in Viet-, but where the geography is the same. We find countless regions where small bands of armed guerrillas can operate effectively in jungles, as the Vietcong do in Vietnam, as Castro did in Cuba, and as is being done on the continents of Africa and South America today.

The question before us is, having been forewarned, have we adequately forearmed ourselves? Have we used too much of our resources in preparing for the kind of warfare which Khrushchev has described as intolerable, and not enough of our resources in preparing for the kind of warfare he described as inevitable?

These hearings will of necessity be held almost exclusively in executive session. will not be accompanied by spectacular press releases, nor will any of the issues to which we direct our attention be prejudged. It is our purpose to study and, if we can, to help them. We are starting our hearings not with the testimony of planners in the Pentagon, who would tell us how our system should work; we are starting our testimony instead with witnesses who have been on the firing line in Vietnam and can tell us how it does work. Today we will hear witnesses who have been on the ground, and who have needed air support; tomorrow we will hear those who have been in the air and have tried to provide it. It is obvious that any weaknesses in our system of close air support have not proved fatal to those whom we will hear from. What others who called for air support and failed to receive it might have testified we can never know. In future sessions we will hear from the men who plan our tactics, procure and manufacture planes, and train our pilots. We will visit the bases and places where these activities are conducted.

I say to each of the witnesses that before we can help you, you will have to be candid with us. I enjoin each of the witnesses to speak freely and in his own words, to give an account of his personal combat experiences in Vietnam during which close air support was requested. We are particularly interested in your personal evaluation of what happened, or what should have happened.

## CHANGE OF RESIDENCE

Senators, Representatives, and Delegates who have changed their residences will please give information thereof to the Government Printing Office, that their addresses may be correctly given in the Record.

# RECORD OFFICE AT THE CAPITOL

An office for the Congressional Record, with Mr. Raymond F. Noyes in charge, is located in room H-112, House wing, where orders will be received for subscriptions to the Record at \$1.50 per month or for single copies at 1 cent for eight pages (minimum charge of 3 cents). Also, orders from Members of Congress to purchase reprints from the Record should be processed through this office.

the Congress. Because it produced banner headlines of an American warning to Peiping, the statement is worth reproducing in full.

Mr. Rusk was asked about charges that Communist China has been "egging on" the fight on the subcontinent. In a reply of studied mildness, he said: "I think there are those who feel that China is trying to fish in troubled waters here. Our own advice in troubled waters here. Our own advice to Peiping would be not to do that and to stay out of it and give the Security Council of the United Nations a chance to settle this

On the other side of the quarrel, the Pakistani side, this country has resisted the itch to make moral judgments about the Kashmir issue. Instead of trying, as the Pakistanis put it, to solve the problem rather than the symptoms, Washington has kept its right-eousness under firm control. The closest this country has come to a pronouncement on Kashmir was again the comment made by the Secretary of State after testimony on the Hill last week.

His words were remarkable for measured care. And once again, because they were widely misinterpreted, they are worth citing. Mr. Rusk was asked about a plebiscite that

would achieve self-determination on Kashmir. He said: "We have expressed our views on that subject over the years. That is part of a general problem of solution of outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. We believe that these matters should be taken up and resolved by peaceful means. We do not believe they should be resolved by force.'

With this country keeping its tone measured, the Russians and Chinese, far from scoring great gains as the beaky hawks would assert, have overreached themselves. Chinese, fearful that a settlement of sorts might be in the works, issued their ultimatums in the evident hope of preventing Pakistan from coming to terms. Lacking the capacity for truly serious action on the ground, they have been obliged to extend the ultimatum. It is now not easy to see how they will emerge without a simultaneous loss of prestige, and a new confirmation of their role as chief international troublemaker.

For their part, the Russians, after issuing the kind of warnings bound to incite Peiping, have pulled the grandstand play of calling for a meeting of Indian and Pakistani representatives in Moscow. If it comes off at all, which is extremely doubtful, it is hard to see how a Moscow meeting can yield concrete results. Far from making the most of an opportunity, the Russians seem merely to be

opportunity, the Russians seem merely to be underlining their own limitations. They may end up with egg all over their face.

The lesson here is not simply Milton's homily that "they also serve who only stand and wait"; that, after all, was an ode to blindness. The true lesson, the lesson for those who would see in the dark, is that in this country's contacts with the Chinese Communists the believes reaction is almost Communists, the bellicose reaction is almost always the wrong reaction. The right policy is to turn to account against the Chinese the miasmic political swamps that fringe the Asian heartland. And nowhere is that more true than in that other Asian trouble spot that we all know in our bones is dimly related the crisis in the subcontinent-Vietnam.

THE DOMINICAN CRISIS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, in recent weeks I have tried to read all testimony available regarding the situation in the Dominican Republic last spring. Having heard the discussion in the Senate in the course of the debate regarding the judgment, or lack of judgment, of our Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Mr. Bennett, Jr., I have reached my own conclusion that the

greater weight of the evidence justifies the conclusion that the recent state-ment of Chairman J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was corroborated and sound.

It is to be noted that following the time Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., made his frantic call to the White House pleading for the immediate sending in of American marines to save American lives, his plea was immediately complied with. Instead of a few thousand marines being sent in to maintain order and save the lives of American civilians, allegedly in danger according to Ambassador Bennett, more than 30,000 men of our Armed Forces were sent in. This would seem almost enough to sink that little island.

I said on May 12, and I consider it a sound statement, that the threat of a Communist takeover was misrepresented and exaggerated. A theatrical touch was added with the statement that our Ambassador, Mr. Bennett, was making his plea from beneath his desk while our Embassy was being fired on. Of course our President is not to be blamed for relying upon the statements of his Ambassador.

It is noteworthy that not one American civilian was killed or wounded in the fighting that took place either before or after Ambassador Bennett made the frantic plea for help. Unfortunately there was fighting between the forces of the military junta and those who were referred to as rebels. The first American killed was a marine who was accidently shot by a fellow marine.

It is noteworthy also that practically all dispatches made public by our State Department and by our President following the initial plea of Ambassador Bennett, Jr. referred to U.S. Ambassadors Martin or Bunker. Ambassador Bunker had apparently taken over. Fortunately, the leader of the junta, Wessin y Wessin, has recently been deported from that unhappy island and is now voicing his complaints from the safety of Florida. Disorder and rioting have ceased, civil authority has been restored. This is all to the good. I am hopeful that free elections in the Dominican Republic will be held as promised.

It is an unfortunate fact that we have in our State Department some officials who seem to denounce as Communists Latin American leaders who take action in opposition to the wealthy economic royalists of any Latin American country. I observed this firsthand while with a factfinding study group in South America for some weeks. Personally, I consider that W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. is one who indicated sympathy for and agreement with leaders of the Dominican junta, and considered the democratic elements and supporters of Juan Bosch as infiltrated or controlled by Communists. There was no justification for that conclusion.

Dr. Juan Bosch, during his 7-month administration as elected president of the Dominican Republic, commenced to give that little island and its people their first experience in democratic government instead of tyranny. He was ousted by a military junta aided by one of the

assassins of the despot Trujillo. In Brazil, Venezuela, Chile and other Latin American countries there are those leaders who are seeking to release the people from the stranglehold of absentee landlordism and to break up huge estates and distribute a part of their huge landholdings to the impoverished, underprivileged laborers and peasants and free them from misery and squalor. Even though such expropriation proceedings are proposed by legal action, it appears that some of our Ambassadors to Latin American countries have in the past almost automatically regarded such leaders as Communists or Communist sympathizers. On the basis of evidence I have read, I believe there is clear and convincing proof that Ambassador Bennett, Jr., failed to distinguish between truly democratic elements in the citizenry and the Communist elements. He showed prejudice in favor of the military junta and against democratic elements of the Dominican Republic.

I am convinced that the views of Chairman Fulbright, that the rebel forces were not controlled by Communist elements, are correct. I am convinced that Ambassador Bennett's conclusions lacked justification. Furthermore, as an indication that Chairman FULBRIGHT'S conclusions have basis in fact, it is well known that almost immediately our President dispatched as special envoy John Bartlow Martin and a little later Ellsworth Bunker, to take over in the Dominican Republic. Following that time, order was restored. Citizens of the Dominican Republic seem to have confidence in Ambassador's Martin and Bunker when many had apparently lacked confidence in Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. It is evident that our President felt the same way.

Mr. President, it seems to me irrefutable that our President's reliance, directly after the start of the rioting and the sending in of Marines responding to the plea of Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., upon John Bartlow Martin and Ellsworth Bunker and apparent disregard of Bennett, Jr., is further verification of the soundness of Chairman Ful-BRIGHT'S conclusions. In my opinion our colleague. Chairman Fulbright, had the greater weight of the evidence in support of his conclusions.

Certainly the Dominican Republic is within our sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. We cannot tolerate any Communist takeover of authority in that little island and I assert there was no evidence of any Castro-like takeover. No Communist was a leader in the revolt. In my judgment there was no preponderance of the evidence available or adduced that such a Communist takeover was even remotely in prospect.

Dan Kurzman, staff writer of the Washington Post, reported that Col. Francisco Caamaño Deno of the so-called rebel forces stated that Ambasador Bennett laughed at him when he asked the Ambassador's help to end the bloodshed. Colonel Caamaño stated he was ready to agree to a cease-fire and to negotiate with the military junta but that Ambassador Bennett refused to mediate and laughed scornfully at him. It is to be traditional system is too entrenched. At Eisenhower College, three trimesters per year will be the standard.

4. An outstading teaching faculty: College teachers are in short supply. The best college teachers are far too few. Eisen-hower College intends to be one of the places to which they gravitate. (Keen interest has already been expressed by established teachers in leading institutions across the country.) Elements which produce this gravitational pull include an academic environment which is stimulating to the keenest mind; a challenge to teach well, but with opportunity for research, publication, study and travel; a sound, but unbiased, Christian outlook; an academic calendar so constructed as to provide refresher breaks three times each year and a regular 4-month leave every 3 years; a curriculum trimmed of frills and irrelevancies so that concentration may be centered on essentials; salaries competitive from the very beginning with the wealthiest colleges; the stimulus of a new program, a share in the direction of educational policies; and such fringe attractions as residence in an attractive region near metropolitan centers.

5. A broad range of student opportunity: Whatever the background of circumstances and pre-college achievement—it is the promise of the applicant that will determine his admission to Eisenhower College. A common false index of "excellence" has been the limitation of admissions to students in the top 10 percent or even 5 percent of their high school classes. This excludes many talents of significant promise. Under these standards, many of the most distinguished graduates of our ivy-covered institutions could not gain admission to those same colleges today.

leges today.

Admission to Eisenhower College will represent not solely a reward for past performance, but also a challenge for the future. Potential motivation will count heavily in the balance of qualifications. Eisenhower College believes that students of promise are

College believes that students of promise are distributed widely throughout at least the top 40 percent of high school achievers and not confined to the top 10 percent. Therefore, while maintaining unremittingly high standards, its doors will be open to a much

broader range of promise than is usual.

6. An efficient college plant: Education often suffers in quality because of an inadequate, poorly planned, wasteful plant. At Eisenhower College, the plant will be planned from the start, and in its entirety, to serve the highest intellectual uses. Kinds of buildings, size, arrangement and location will all be designed as integral parts of the educational program itself. Administrative, academic and living quarters will be interrelated for maximum use and impact. The plant, like the curriculum, will be designed to serve as a demonstration model. Preliminary architectural studies are proceeding, and it is Eisenhower College's uncompromising aim to bring the leading architectural insights to the service of its high academic goals.

These are the six outstanding features of quality at Eisenhower College: World outlook, select curriculum, year-round operation, an outstanding teaching faculty, a broad range of student opportunity, and an efficient college plant.

Certain of these, alone, might make Eisenhower College a noteworthy undertaking. Added together, they form a truly unique profile, significant for the future of higher education, with a real potential for greatness.

APPOINTMENT OF ELMER HOEHN AS HEAD OF OIL IMPORT PRO-GRAM: AN INSULT TO AMERICAN CONSUMERS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, at 9:30 this morning, Mr. Elmer Hoehn was sworn in as head of the Oil Import Administration.

If the administration tried to find a nan who would be least likely to protect the interests of the millions of American consumers of oil, it could not have done worse.

Mr. Hoehn was executive secretary of the Independent Oil Producers & Land Owners Association, Tristate. This orgunization represents producers in Indana, Illinois, and Kentucky.

It has played an active role in advocating the cutting of imports proposed by the Independent Petroleum Association of America.

As Oil Import Administrator, Hoehn will have the top responsibility for adjusting imports of petroleum and petroleum products in the United States in accordance with the Presidential proclamation of March 10, 1959. Hoehn will runtilus operation under the Secretary of the Interior.

The 1959 Presidential proclamation in the interest of national security imposes restrictions on the importation of crude oil, unflnished oil and finished petroleum products.

As Administrator Hoehn will allocate imports of oil among qualified applicants. He will issue import licenses on the basis of such allocations.

Thus, a man who had been hired to represent the oil interests fighting quotas will now sit in the driver's seat to determine how big those quotas will be.

It would be difficult to imagine a more unethical betrayal of the consumers' interests, or a more deliberate insult to the American oil consumer.

Elmer Hoehn is the same man reported by Oil Daily as active in discussions with the Democratic Platform Committee last Fall regarding depletion and oil imports.

Hoehn appears to have proved his effectiveness to the oil industry then.

The 1960 Democratic platform had dinounced depletion as a conspicuous loophole that is inequitable. But the 1964 platform—showing the influence of Hoelin—does not mention this most notorious of oil tax loopholes.

UNITED STATES HANDLING OF IN-DIA-PAKISTAN WAR EXCELLENT TO DATE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, there is always a carload of brickbats thrown at the administration when anything goes wrong with our foreign policy. In the kind of world in which we live, with America as the unquestioned leader of the free world and the pre-eminent

military force in the world, this Nation—and specifically the President of this Nation—is blamed for almost everything that happens throughout the world. The India-Pakistan war is no exception.

Thoughtful and careful observers now are coming to agree that the way the President and Secretary of State have handled the India-Pakistan war has wonvery high marks for professional competence.

Of course, we can never be sure what is going to happen tomorrow or an hour from now, but at present it appears that the quiet, steady, but powerful, influence of this Nation may be the big element in winning a peaceful resolution of the tragic India-Pakistan clash.

In the course of this development, the rough and ready willingness of China to exploit the war has been met by the Johnson administration quietly but very effectively indeed. The consequence for our position in Vietnam as well as elsewhere in Asia, and indeed in the world, has been all to the good.

One of the most thoughtful and per-

One of the most thoughtful and perceptive appraisals of this American foreign policy success, an analysis by Joseph Kraft, appeared in this morning's Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PEACEMAKING IN ASIA (By Joseph Kraft)

Victory a la Hitler and Napoleon, victory that means selzed capitals and subdued countries, is not in the cards in the Indian subcontinent. Given the terrain, the size of the forces, and the state of the local art, the worst likely military trouble is intensified fighting ending in the kind of non-end that has characterized almost all frontier struggles in the postwar era.

But there is a serious diplomatic danger

But there is a serious diplomatic danger that could materialize within a month. It would be possible for Russia to emerge from the present troubles as the dominant diplomatic power in India. China could emerge as the dominant diplomatic power in Pakistan. It is against that awful outcome that American diplomacy must be mobilized.

So far it can be said that the administration has met the test with remarkable sophistication. It has shown a clear appreciation of what has been going on. It has scrupulously avoided panicky reactions and unilateral moves that could only make matters worse. It has even avoided that fatal combination that has been the hallmark of American diplomacy through the decades the combination of force and unctuous rectitude.

On one side, the Indian side, of the quarrel, this country has for once resisted the temptation to indulge in an orgy of Chinabatting. Unlike the Pakistanis, Indians and Russians who have all been doing the kind of things that make the Chinese look 10 feet tall, the United States has been patient and moderate.

The strongest official statement about Chinese intervention made by the United States was a remark made last week by the Secretary of State after giving testimony to

noted that Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, directly after his arrival in the Dominican Republic, encouraged mediation efforts between the two factions.

It has seemed to me that there was never an occasion for us to have approximately 30,000 men of our Armed Forces in Santo Domingo. This could be likened to wielding a sledgehammer to drive in a tack.

Fortunately, instead of aiding and abetting General Wessin y Wessin and other junta leaders as apparently was done by Ambassador Bennett at the outset, our policy was reversed, and wisely. Wessin y Wessin is in exile and civilian authority is now in charge.

Very likely more of our Marines will shortly be withdrawn as law and order seem to have been restored. Recognition, although belated, was given to the Organization of American States and small military components of some members of that organization have been and are presently helping uphold civilian authority.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY CHRYSLER CORP. OF PRICE INCREASE IN 1966 AUTOMOBILES

Mr. HART. Mr. President, today I would like to comment on the recent announcement by Chrysler Corp. of price increases for their 1966 model cars.

To me, as one outside the corporation, Chrysler's new price schedule is—in the light of profit figures—both surprising and disturbing. As the table, which I shall ask be made part of the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks, demonstrates, in 1964 the Chrysler Corp. reported profits, after taxes, of \$214 million—equal to a return of more than 19 percent of its invested capital. The Ford Motor Co. earned more than half a billion dollars in profits, after taxes. And the General Motors Corp. reported the greatest profits of any corporation in U.S. history, more than \$1.734 billion—equal to a return of 23 percent on its invested capital.

The company cites increased costs of new equipment as the reason for the Certainly everyone applauds the installation of safety equipment on the new car models, and most certainly the present occupant of the chair [Mr. Ken-NEDY of New York]. But we would not want this to be a smokescreen for unjustified price increases.

In its price increase announcement Chrysler made no mention of increased productivity. That would appear to cancel out at least part of any increases in cost of the added safety features.

Productivity-output per man-hourin the auto industry is increasing at a very rapid rate—by as much of 5 percent according to some sources, by at least 3.5 percent according to very conservative estimates. This means that the same number of cars can be built this year as a year ago, with somewhere between 3.5 and 5 percent fewer manhours. The savings in costs per unit of output are obvious.

Another real concern is whether the other auto firms will follow traditional practice and match the increases. In

the past the auto companies generally have followed the highest price leader. In 1956, for example, Ford initially announced an average price increase on its 1957 models of 2.9 percent. Two weeks later General Motors increased its 1957 model prices by an average of 6.1 percent. Promptly Ford and Chrysler revised their prices upward to match almost dollar for dollar the higher GM prices.

A demonstration of parallel pricingin this period of unparalleled profits would naturally generate increased concern about a lack of price competition within the industry.

If this price pattern is repeated and the other auto firms follow Chrysler's lead, the impact on the consumer and the entire economy could be great. Based on an anticipated sale of 9 million cars in the 1966 model year, a price hike following the lines of the Chrysler announcement—averaging more than \$50 a -would cost the American consumer haff a billion dollars in higher prices.

Further, an increase in car prices liewed in light of recent price rises in other basic industries, could touch off an inflationary spiral.

I need not elaborate on the possible adverse consequences of inflationary moves at this time. But it is a consequence which we must continually be on guard to prevent.

It is true that all the economic factors of this price boost are not yet in. But on the face of it, justification is doubtful at best.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have 1 additional minute.

objection, it is so ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Mr. HART. When General Motors and Ford sit at their respective conference tables to decide how to react to the Chrysler action, I hope that the consumer view will also be heard.

I ask unanimous consent that a statistical table using July's Fortune magazine statistics and a news article from the Wall Street Journal of September 22 be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Profits in the auto industry, 1964

Company	After tax net profit	Profit as percent of invested capital
General Motors Ford Chrysler	\$1, 734, 782, 000 505, 642, 000 213, 770, 000	22. 8 12. 6 19. 1
American Motors  Average, all industries	26, 227, 000	9. 4

Source: Fortune, July 1965.

MOST OF CHRYSLER PRICE INCREASES EXCEED COST OF ADDED SAFETY ITEMS BY \$10 TO 835

Price increases posted by Chrysler Corp. on its 1966 models generally exceed the cost of safety equipment added to the cars by \$10 to \$35, with most increases in the higher end of the range.

Chrysler announced prices late Monday for cars that go on sale September 30, becoming the first auto company to list 1966 price tags. The company raised base prices on most of

its 128 models by 2.1 to 3.6 percent.

There were indications in Detroit that General Motors Corp. also may announce prices soon, although GM's divisions won't put new cars on sale until October 7-14. Ford Motor Co. and American Motors Corp. said they don't expect to announce prices until shortly before they start selling new models, October 1 for Ford and October 7 for AMC. None of the other companies would comment on Chrysler's price increases or their own price plans.

Industry sources were surprised at Chrysler's decision to announce 1966-model prices so early, especially in view of indications from Washington officials that they expected the auto industry to hold the price line. Chrysler said yesterday that it hadn't received any comment from Federal officials on its decision to raise prices.

ADMINISTRATION NONCOMMITTAL FOR NOW

A Washington official said yesterday that unless there's an abrupt change of plans, the Johnson administration expects to remain noncommittal on the Chrysler price changes until late November or early December.

It will take until then, he explained, for the Bureau of Labor Statistics to evaluate the changes in its usual manner as it prepares the consumer price index. The announcement by Chrysler came too late this month to be included in the index of September, he explained, so it will be reflected in the index for October.

Also, the administration has decided it must wait because the Bureau has a longestablished procedure for determining to what extent quality improvements offset any increases in auto prices, and because the Bureau is known for being "immune from politics and pressure of all kinds."

# REUTHER DENOUNCES ACTION

Walter P. Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers, denounced Chrysler's price increases, charging they had "absolutely no economic justification." He alleged that production efficiency was so high in the auto industry that prices could be cut and still allow the companies "handsome profits."

"If the price increase announced by Chrysler is a forerunner of similar action by the balance of the industry," Mr. Reuther said, the UAW will ask Congress to "initiate a searching investigation of auto costs, prices and profits."

Mr. Reuther hinted strongly that the UAW will urge the Johnson administration to pressure Chrysler and other companies on their pricing plans. "It isn't yet too late to turn pricing plans. "It isn't yet too late to turn back this profiteering assault on the consumer and on national price stability." Mr. Reuther said. "Chrysler can be persuaded to back down if General Motors and Ford to back down if General Motors and Ford to the consumer to refuse to go along, just as U.S. Steel was persuaded to rescind its unjustifiable 1962 price increase" by President Kennedy.

One Congressman attacked Chrysler's price increases yesterday. Noting that the Federal excise tax was reduced from 10 percent to 7 percent last summer, Representative Vanik, Democrat, of Ohio, charged "It looks as though the auto industry is reneging on its promise of less than a year ago to pass the excise tax reduction on to the American con-

The 10-percent factory tax on autos was cut to 7 percent retroactive to May 15 and is to drop to 6 percent next January 1; it is to fall to 4 percent a year later and to 2 percent on January 1, 1968, leveling off at 1 percent on January 1, 1969.

#### TAX SAVINGS PASSED ALONG

To reserve judgment until the bureau's analysis is completed, more than 2 months hence, could reduce the Government's

chances of countering through publicity any price increase that might prove to have occurred. But the matter is too important to warrant "going off half-cocked," as one official put it.

Chrysler maintained, however, that it was continuing to pass along excise tax savings to customers and added that it will also pass along future reductions in the tax which Congress has scheduled.

Price increases were necessitated by the addition of five safety items as standard equipment and certain other improvements in the cars, Chrysler said. The safety items, which previously were offered only as options on most models, added an average of \$19 to the retail prices of 1966 cars, Chrysler Indicated.

. Most of Chrysler's price increases fell in a range from \$59 on a typical Valiant compact to \$84 on a typical Plymouth. Thus it was indicated that \$10 to \$35 of the price increases couldn't be attributed to additional safety equipment, which was placed on all cars after congressional prodding.

There were exceptions to the general pattern. Prices of some Dart and Valiant models were increased only by an amount approximately equal to the former optional retail price of currently standard safety equipment. On the other hand, the price of the sporty Barracuda was increase 1 by \$103, or more than \$50 above the apparent cost of additional safety equipment.

Big Chryslers and Imperials, which carried safety equipment as standard in 1965, will cost \$42 to \$84 more than in 1965. But bigger engines and certain other features have been made standard in these cars, Chrysler said. On the basis of 1965 optional prices for the larger engines and other than optional features, Chrysler said it has actually cut prices by as much as \$152 for a comparably equipped Imperial. Based on the company's figuring, some other Chrysler and Imperial models were effectively reduced in price. But prices of some luxury cars were increased by as much as \$59, by the company's own figuring.

OTHER COMPANIES' ITEMS

The safety package Chrysler has added to all its cars doesn't include some items other companies have said will be standard on their models. The other three companies will offer the same safety items as Ch ysler plus padded sun visors and, in the case of American Motors and Ford, four-way lashing systems for emergency use.

Based on present optional prices, pridded visors and flashing systems would add about \$25 to the price of a car. Accordingly, if Ford and AMC increase prices for their added safety equipment as expected, they may find that their models are at about the same price level as competitive Chrysler models—but without the \$10 to \$35 Chrysler will get on most of its models above the price of rafety equipment.

Chrysler said it will make paddec sun visors standard equipment on all its cars in January; this item costs \$5 to \$6 as an option. Chrysler and GM will offer flashing systems only as options in 1966; this item costs \$19 to \$20 as an option.

Chrysler apparently feels the auto market is strong enough to absorb price inc eases without dampening buyer interest, although in the past Chrysler officials have crudited general price stability over the past 6 years as a strong factor in rising sales. But along with other auto companies, Chrysler has said recently that it expects 1966 sales to at least equal this year's record volume.

Chrysler said retail prices of options and accessories remain generally unchanged in 1966.

Following are representative retail prices of Chrysler Corp. cars. They include the 7 percent Federal excise tax for both years and certain other charges, but exclude nor -Federal taxes, freight charges and optional equipment.

Chrysler-Plymouth Division

	1965	1966 1	In- crease
Valiant (compact):			
4-door 200 sedan	\$2, 167	\$2, 228	\$59
Signet convertible	2,526	2, 527	l "i
Barracuda 2-door hardtop	2,453	2, 556	103
Belvedere (intermediate):	2, 200	2,000	100
Belvedere I. 2-door sedan	2, 198	2, 277	79
Belvedere II. 4-door sedan	2, 321	2,405	84
			83
Satellite V-8, 2-door hardtop.	2,612	2,695	80
Fury (standard):		1	1
Fury I, 2-door	2,348	2,426	78
Fury II, V-8, 4-door sedan	2,604	2.684	80
Fury III. V-8, 4-door sedan	2,753	2,823	70
Chrysler:	_,	-,	1
Newport, 4-door sedan	2,968	3,052	84
Tree Tree of the beat the	2,800		59
New Yorker, 2 2-door hardtop.	4,098	4, 157	0.8
Imperial:	1	1	1
4-door hardtop 2	5,691	5,733	42

1 Chrysler-Plymouth 1966 cars include the following items as standard equipment, which were options on most Plymouth models in 1965: Backup lights, outside left rear-view mirrors, padded instrument panels, and variable speed windshield wipers and washers. Chrysler Corp. said the 1965 retail price for these items as options averaged \$49, varying from \$47.50 to \$52.65, depending on the model. The manufacturer's wholesale price was \$40.20, according to industry sources.

2 Chrysler and Imperial cars carried the previously listed items as standard equipment in 1965, but for 1966 certain other items have been added as standard equipment on these models. Chrysler New Yorkers now have a 440-cubic-inch engine a standard equipment replacing a 413-cubic-inch engine as standard equipment replacing a 413-cubic-inch engine as standard equipment replacing as 13-cubic-inch engine as standard equipment replacing as 413-cubic-inch engine as standard equipment replacing as 413-cubic-inch engine as standard equipment replacing as 413-cubic-inch engine. Imperials also have the larger engine, along with reclining seats and integral headrests as standard equipment.

NOTE.—All cars sold in California will carry an anti-

Note.—All cars sold in California will carry an antismog device as standard equipment in compliance with State law. The devices will increase base price of 6-cylinder cars by \$18 and 8-cylinder cars by \$25. Chrysler Corp. said.

Dodge Division

	1965	1966 <sup>1</sup>	In- crease
Dart (compact):			
4-door sedan	\$2, 112	\$2,158	\$46
270 4-door station wagon	2,472	2, 533	61
GT V-8 hardtop	2,500	2,545	45
Coronet (intermediate):		'	
4-door sedan	2, 227	2,302	75
Deluxe 4-door station wagon	2, 556	2,631	75
440 convertible	2,586	2, 672	86
	2,000	2,012	00
Polara (standard):	0.002	2, 763	68
318 4-door sedan	2,695		00
4-door hardtop	2,874	2,948	74
Monaco (called Custom 880 in	ł	1	1
1965):	ł	1	1
2-door hardtop	3,043	3,107	64

1 Dodge 1966 cars include the following items as standard equipment, which were options on most Dodge models in 1965: Backup lights, outside left-hand rearview mirror, padded instrument panel and variable speed wipers and washers. Chrysler Corp. said the 1965 retail price for these items as options averaged \$49, varying from \$47.50 to \$52.05, depending on the model. The manufacturer's wholesale price was \$40.20, according to industry sources.

Note.—All cars sold in California will carry an antismog device as standard equipment in compliance with State law. The devices will increase base prices of 6-cylinder cars by \$18 and 8-cylinder cars by \$25, Chrylser Corp. said.

# BIG BROTHER: IRS SNOOPING

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, I would like to call the Senate's attention to some recent newspaper articles which I think indicate a growing public awareness of the big brotherism which threatens our freedoms.

I welcome this growing awareness, Mr. President. I think the American people are beginning to realize what some of the agents in the IRS and the FDA and some of our other Government agencies are up to. And when enough of them realize that, I think they are going to demand that we do something about it.

The first of these articles is an excerpt from the very fine statement of Dr. William M. Beaney, a professor of political science and law at Princeton University,

printed in the June 17, 1965, issue of the Newark Evening News.

The second article, by Mr. Robert Waters, is from the Hartford, Conn., Courant of August 2, 1965. It reports that U.S. Attorney Jon O. Newman has instructed Federal law-enforcement agencies in Connecticut to obey the Federal ban on wiretapping and to limit their bugging activities to those types permitted by law. This is an admirable step in the right direction and I want to commend Mr. Newman for it; but I would also point out that it is a sad state of affairs when Federal agencies must be reminded to obey the law.

Finally, I have three articles from the Chicago papers, all dealing with the same case. In this recent case, a Federal judge dismissed indictments against two men alleged to be gamblers because the Internal Revenue Service had used one of its electronic snooping devices to obtain evidence against them. Now, the IRS has been saying that the hearings of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure have been hurting the organized crime drive. I think these articles indicate that one thing that hinders the organized crime drive is the illegal and unconstitutional tactics used by IRS

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have these articles printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Chicago Sun-Times, July 30, 1965] BOOKIE INDICTMENTS VOIDED-PHONE SNOOPER HELD TILEGAL

A Federal judge delivered a blow to the Government's war on bookles Thursday as he dismissed two indictments on the ground that they were based on evidence gathered by a telephone snooper device.

Freed were Nick Guglielmo, 34, of 4824 West Rice, and Joseph B. (Joey D.) Delmonico, 46, of 5918 Park, Cicero.

They were arrested August 21, 1964, in a basement at 2501 South Gunderson, Berwyn, which raiding authorities said was a wire-room center. They were charged with fail-ure to possess Federal wagering stamps and failure to register as bookmakers.

Chief Judge William J. Campbell, of U.S. district court, ruled the use of a pen register system by the Illinois Bell Telephone Co. to record the dial pulses of all telephone numbers called from a phone in the basement was a violation of the Federal Communications

## FIRST COURT RULING

A phone company spokesman said Judge Campbell's ruling was the first of its kind Though the pen register system had been used to develop hundreds of cases, the company's legal department was unaware, he said, of any pending cases that might be affected by the decision.

U.S. Attorney Edward V. Hanrahan de-clined immediate comment. The pen register has been used by State as well as Federal authorities to obtain search warrants for raids.

The phone company emphasized that the pen register is a recording device at the central office which cuts out after the dialing process is completed, without indicating whether or not the call was completed.

It is used in the regular course of business, the spokesman said, to trade lewd and nui-sance calls and to further the company's studies of traffic. It was developed originally to test the dialing accuracy of subscribers using dial phones for the first time.

Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110027-6

# CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S.J. Res. 98. Joint resolution authorizing and requesting the President to extend through 1966 his proclamation of a period to "See the United States," and for other purposes.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI-CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE AP-PENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. MONRONEY:

Address entitled "America, the Beautiful," delivered by the Honorable Russell E. Train, president of the Conservation Foundation, at the annual meeting of the American Forestry Association, held jointly with the National Council of State Garden Clubs, at Jackson Lake Lodge, Wyo.; which will appear hereafter in the Appendix.

By Mr. METCALF: Article entitled "From Race of Sorrows to Morning Star." written by Beverley B. Morales and published in the Billings Gazette, in tribute to the St. Labre Mission. By Mrs. NEUBERGER:

Article entitled "Are Trading Stamps Loosing Their Punch?" published in Business Week of September 4, 1965.

By Mr. LAUSCHE: Constitution Day program of the Canton,

Ohio Kiwanis Club.

# AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, since the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Fulbright] made a speech on the floor of the Senate last week relative to our operations in the Dominican Republic, many words have been spoken in reference to that speech in the Chamber. However, as might have been expected, the reception given the speech outside the halls of Congress was somewhat warmer than the reception given it by certain Senators.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an editorial which appeared in the Bennington Banner, of Bennington, Vt., on September 20, entitled "Senator Fulbright's Unpleasant Truths."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S UNPLEASANT TRUTHS

It will be surprising if Senator Fulbright's blockbusting statement of last week on U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic doesn't produce a profound chill in his relations with the White House.

Senator Fulbright, to be sure, was careful to blame what he considers gross mishandling of the Dominican crisis on the President's advisers. Yet it is hardly flattering to President Johnson to say that he was pushed by his subordinates into an unjustified military adventure, and into mis-representing the facts to the American peo-

The burden of the Senate foreign policy chairman's argument is that the marines were sent into Santo Domingo last April not, as the President claimed, to save American as the President claimed, to save American lives but to prevent "a return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party."

He contends further that estimates of Communist influence in the revolutionary movement were grossly exaggerated and that

evidence doesn't verify the administration's assertion that the revolution was in danger of being taken over by Communist elements when we intervened.

Senator Fulbright also raised other important questions that our Latin American policymakers would do well to ponder before they advise the President to intervene in another revolution. Most important, Sen-ator Fulbright asks whether the administration's reaction to the Dominican crisis is part of a broader shift in its attitudes toward Latin American countries.

He makes it clear that social revolution is inevitable in Latin America, and that the United States can use its power to influence the choice the Latin Americans make. choice, more often than not, will be between

cnoice, more often than not, will be between corrupt military dictatorships and social revolutionary parties.

"Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning," the Senator declared, "the approach followed in the Dominical Berublic if consistently nursured." the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of

all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere." The United States must decide, he suggested, 'whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left, or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of com-munism like that of Fidel Castro."

Predictably, the words had hardly left Senator Fulbright's mouth before he was accused of being soft on communism, but these charges in no way detract from the importance of the issues he has raised. Intervention in the affairs of another nation, as the United States often loudly proclaims, is an extreme and not easily justified course of action. The lessons learned in the Dominican Republic should make us think

twice before trying it again.
Under normal circumstances, one might perhaps question the propriety of such a frontal attack by the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee on the policies of a Democratic president. But the circumstances in this case are not normal, first, because the Republican leadership in Congress is too illiberal to make the point that FULBRIGHT has made, and second, because the issue raised by our Dominican adventure is far too important to be stifled

by a senseless consensus.

It can be argued, perhaps, that the Senator does not make sufficient allowances for the political dilemma which the Johnson Administration faced in the Dominican crisis. Obviously the President and his advisers were strongly motivated by a morbid fear of what would happen to the Demo-crats' political fortunes if they permitted the establishment of "another Cuba." No doubt they reasoned that even in a 1-in-20 chance of a Communist takeover was a risk to be avoided at any cost.

But this is a pretty poor excuse for a decision that alined us with the enemies of reform, violated our solemn treaty obligations, and rendered our Latin American aims deeply suspect among liberals everywhere. FULBRIGHT is right when he says the Johnson administration should have had the sense and the courage to take the minimal risk entailed in casting our lot with the forces of social justice.

Mr. AIKEN. The Bennington Banner, it may be recalled, won first prize last spring for being the best made up and best established newspaper in the United States, regardless of circulation. I believe the editorial, whether one agrees with all it contains or not, is a fine example of how this small Vermont news-

paper happened to win over all the other publications in the United States, both large and small.

Mr. President, will the Mr. CLARK. Senator yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. Is the Senator putting in the RECORD an editorial about the Dominican situation from a Bennington, Vt., newspaper?

Mr. AIKEN. That is correct. It is a well written editorial, and it relates to the speech which was made by the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Fulbright], last week.

Mr. CLARK. I have found myself in complete agreement with the editorial, which I thought was very constructive. I wonder if the Senator from Vermont is also in accord.

Mr. AIKEN. I made a few remarks the other day to the effect that while I thought the President was justified in taking some action that night-I think he would probably have been negligent had he not taken some action—I agreed with the Senator from Arkansas that there were a good many unnecessary mistakes made before a temporary government was finally established, primarily by backing the wrong-

Mr. CLARK. Horse?
Mr. AIKEN. The wrong personality Mr. AIKEN. to start with, and certain other mistakes which I do not intend to itemize.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend from Vermont.

# PEACEMAKING IN ASIA

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the immediate reaction of the United States to the war between Pakistan and India, and to the Chinese border demands upon India, has been one of admirable restraint. President Johnson and his foreign policy advisers are to be commended for the finesse and sophistication they have shown in dealing with this grave crisis in the Asian subcontinent.

In this morning's edition of the Washington Post, Mr. Joseph Kraft contributes a brilliant article, entitled "Peacemaking in Asia," in which he gives the Johnson administration the credit due it for the initial steps taken thus far in dealing with the delicate diplomatic problems posed by this unfortunate war.

I ask unanimous consent that the Kraft column be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## PEACEMAKING IN ASIA (By Joseph Kraft)

Victory a la Hitler and Napoleon, victory that means seized capitals and subdued countries, is not in the cards in the Indian subcontinent. Given the terrain, the size of the forces, and the state of the local art, the worst likely military trouble is intensified fighting ending in the kind of nonend that has characterized almost all frontier struggles in the postwar era.

But there is a serious diplomatic danger that could materialize within a month. It would be possible for Russia to emerge from the present troubles as the dominant diplomatic power in India. China could emerge as the dominant diplomatic power in Pakistan. It is against that awful outcome that American diplomacy must be mobilized

So far it can be said that the administration has met the test with remarkable sophistication. It has shown a clear appreciation of what has been going on. It has scrupulously avoided panicky reactions and uni-lateral moves that could only make matters worse. It has even avoided that fatal com-bination that has been the hallmark of American diplomacy through the decades the combination of force and unctuous rectitude.

On one side, the Indian side, of the quarrel, this country has for once resisted the temptation to indulge in an orgy of Chinabaiting. Unlike the Pakistanis, Indians, and Russians who have all been doing the kind of things that make the Chinese look 10 feet tall, the United States has been patient and moderate.

The strongest official statement about Chinese intervention made by the United States was a remark made last week by the Secretary of State after giving testimony to the Congress. Because it produced ban-ner headlines of an American warning to Peiping, the statement is worth reproducing in full.

Mr. Rusk was asked about charges that Communist China has been "egging on" the fight on the subcontinent. In a reply of studied mildness, he said: "I think there are those who feel that China is trying to fish in troubled waters here. Our own advice to Peiping would be not to do that and to stay out of it and give the Security Council of the United Nations a chance to settle this matter."

On the other side of the quarrel, the Pakistani side, this country has resisted the itch to make moral judgments about the Kashmir issue. Instead of trying, as the Pakistanis put it, to solve the problem rather than the symptoms, Washington has kept its righteousness under firm control. closest this country has come to a pro-nouncement on Kashmir was again the comment made by the Secretary of State after testimony on the Hill last week.

His words were remarkable for measured care. And once again, because they were widely misinterpreted, they are worth citing.

Mr. Rusk was asked about a plebiscite that would achieve self-determination on Kash-mir. He said: "We have expressed our views on that subject over the years. That is part of a general problem of solution of outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. believe that these matters should be taken up and resolved by peaceful means. not believe they should be resolved by force.'

With this country keeping its tone measured, the Russians and Chinese, far from scoring great gains as the beaky hawks would assert, have over reached themselves. Chinese, fearful that a settlement of sorts might be in the works, issued their ulti-matums in the evident hope of preventing Pakistan from coming to terms. Lacking the capacity for truly serious action on the ground, they have been obliged to extend the ultimatum. It is now not easy to see how they will emerge without a simultaneous loss of prestige, and a new confirmation of their role as chief international troublemaker.

For their part, the Russians, after issuing the kind of warnings bound to incite Pelping, have pulled the grandstand play of calling for a meeting of Indian and Pakistani representatives in Moscow. If it comes off at all, which is extremely doubtful, it is hard to see how a Moscow meeting can yield concrete results. Far from making the most of an opportunity, the Russians seem merely to be underlining their own limitations. They may end up with egg all over their face.

The lesson here is not simply Milton's homily that "they also serve who only stand and wait"; that, after all, was an ode to blindness. The true lesson, the lesson for

those who would see in the dark, is that in this country's contacts with the Chinese Communists, the bellicose reaction is almost always the wrong reaction. The right policy is to turn to account against the Chinese the miasmic political swamps that fringe the Asian heartland. And nowhere is that more true than in that other Asian trouble spot that we all know in our bones is dimly related to the crisis in the subcon--Vietnam.

SPECIAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES SERVING IN COMBAT ZONES

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 2127) to amend title 38, United States Code, in order to provide special indemnity insurance for members of the Armed Forces serving in combat zones, and for other purposes, which was to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That (a) chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by redesignating "Subchapter III—General" thereof as "Subchapter IV—General" and by inserting immediately after subchapter II thereof the following new subchapter III:

"SUBCHAPTER III SERVICEMEN'S GROUP LIFE INSURANCE

"§ 765. Definitions

"For the purpose of this subchapter-

"(1) The term 'active duty' means full-time duty as a commissioned or warrant officer, or as an enlisted member of a uniformed service under a call or order to duty that does not specify a period of thirty days or less.

"(2) The term 'member' means a person on active duty in the uniformed services in a commissioned, warrant, or enlisted rank or grade.

"(3) The term 'uniformed services' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, and Environmental Science Services Administration.

"\$ 766. Eligible insurance companies

"(a) The Administrator is authorized, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 5), to purshase from one or more life insurance companies a policy or policies of group life inthis subchapter. Each such life insurance company must (1) be licensed to issue life insurance in each of the fifty States of the Inited States and in the District of Columha, and (2) as of the most recent December 31 for which information is available to the Administrator, have in effect at least per centum of the total amount of group life insurance which all life insurance companies have in effect in the United States.

"(b) The life insurance company or companies issuing such policy or policies shall establish an administrative office at a place and under a name designated by the Admin-1strator.

"(c) The Administrator shall arrange with the life insurance company or companies issuing any policy or policies under this subchapter to reinsure, under conditions approved by him, portions of the total amount of insurance under such policy or policies with such other life insurance companies (which meet qualifying criteria set forth by the Administrator) as may elect to part cipate in such reinsurance.

"(d) The Administrator may at any time discontinue any policy or policies which he has purchased from any insurance company under this subchapter.

"§ 767. Persons insured; amount

"(a) Any policy of insurance purchased by the Administrator under section 766 of this title shall automatically insure any member of the uniformed services on active duty against death in the amount of \$10,000 from the first day of such duty, or from the date certified by the Administrator to the Secretary concerned as the date Service-men's Group Life Insurance under this subchapter takes effect, whichever date is the later date, unless such member elects in writing (1) not to be insured under this subchapter, or (2) to be insured in the amount of \$5,000.

"(b) If any member elects not to be insured under this subchapter or to be insured in the amount of \$5,000, he may thereafter be insured under this subchapter or insured in the amount of \$10,000 under this subchapter, as the case may be, upon written application, proof of good health, and compliance with such other terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Administrator.

'§ 768. Termination of coverage; conversion

"Each policy purchased under this subchapter shall contain a provision, in terms approved by the Administrator, to the effect that any insurance thereunder on any member of the uniformed services shall cease (except in the case of members absent without leave) one hundred and twenty days after his separation or release from active duty, and that during the period such insurance is in force the insured upon request to the administrative office established under subsection 766(b) of this title shall be furnished a list of life insurance companies participating in the program established under this subchapter and upon written application (within such period) to the participating company selected by the insured and payment of the required premiums be granted insurance without a medical examination on a plan then currently written by such company which does not provide for the payment of any sum less than the face value thereof or for the payment of an additional amount as premiums if the insured engages in the military service of the United States, to replace the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance in effect on the insured's life under this subchapter. In addition to life insurance companies participating in the program established under this subchapter, such list shall include additional life insurance companies (not so participating) which meet qualifying criteria, terms, and conditions established by the Administrator and agree to sell insurance to members and former members in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sentence. In the case of any member who is absent without leave for a period of more than thirty-one days, insurance under this subchapter shall cease as of the date such absence commenced. Any such member so absent without leave, upon return to duty, may again be insured under this subchapter, but only if he complies with the requirements set forth in section 767(b) of this section.

'\$769. Deductions; payment; investment; expenses

"(a) During any period in which a member is insured under a policy of insurance purchased by the Administrator under section 766 of this title, there shall be deducted each month from his basic or other pay until separation or release from active duty an amount determined by the Administrator (which shall be the same for all such members) as the share of the cost attributable to insuring such member under such policy, less any cost traceable to the extra hazard of active duty in the uniformed service. Any amount not deducted from the basic